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The Nature and Consequence of
"Valid Existing Rights" Status in
Public Land Law
JAN G. LAITOS*
When the United States Congress or federal executive branch
make federal law, this law often expresses the lawmaker's inten-
tion in vague, almost cryptic language.1 The result of this am-
biguity is that the desires of the federal lawmaker2 must be
determined by somebody other than the entity creating the law.
Implementing agencies, courts, lawyers, and commentators are
usually enlisted to aid in the job of ascertaining the intent of
the lawmaker.
The recurrent use of the phrase "subject to valid existing
rights" 3 is a good example of this tendency to rely on unclear
wording to express a federal law-maker's intent in public land
law. 4 This phrase typically occurs in federal public land laws
* Professor of Law and Director, Natural Resources Program, University of
Denver College of Law.
The United States Congress expresses federal law through federal statutes; the
federal executive branch creates federal law either through agency regulations or executive
orders, both of which must be consistent with some authorizing federal statute.
I This article uses the generic "federal law-maker" to encompass all federal
entities which have the power to "make" federal law, and which have in the past
acknowledged and protected "valid existing rights" in this law. These entities include
the U.S. Congress, the President, and various federal agencies.
I Sometimes a federal law-maker uses a phrase similar to, but not exactly the
same as, "subject to valid existing rights." See, e.g., President Roosevelt's Nov. 9, 1907
Executive Order No. 709 withdrawing land surrounding an Indian reservation (... "this
withdrawal shall not affect any existing valid rights of any person"), construed in Battese
v. Apache County, 630 P.2d 1027 (Ariz. 1981). One of the purposes of this article will
be to analyze whether the federal law- maker's use of such different wording indicates
an intent to apply the phrase differently than would have been the case had the language
tracked the more commonly-occurring wording-"subject to valid existing rights." See
text accompanying notes 168-169, infra.
4 The phrase "public land law" is intended here to describe that vast body of
federal law creating, allocating, and regulating federally-owned lands and resources (e.g.,
minerals). Public land law can stem from federal statute, presidential order, agency rule,
or decisions by the Secretary of the Interior or Secretary of Agriculture.
Sometimes a federal public land law may regulate state and privately-owned lands
and resources. See, e.g., the Federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
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which would otherwise affect pre-existing private interests in land
or resources. Because the phrase is never defined, one is never
certain what kinds of interests are intended to fall within its
scope. Nor is it clear what consequences should follow if a
private interest is deemed to be a "valid existing right." As a
result, lawyers representing private interests arguably included in
the phrase have had to turn to agencies and courts in an attempt
to clarify the meaning and effect of the phrase.' Commentators
have also tried to be helpful by offering interpretative analysis
of "valid existing rights" in scholarly journals.
6
This article likewise seeks to make sense out of the standard
"subject to valid existing rights" (VER) phrase. After reviewing
the circumstances that usually precipitate the need for the VER
phrase, the article explains why VER language is chosen by law-
makers (Part I), and offers guidance on how its deceptively
simple wording should be interpreted (Part II). The point of the
article is that the mysteries of VER can be unlocked only by
making several assumptions. Among the most important are: by
incorporating VER language in federal law, the federal law-
maker intends (1) that the VER phrase be construed according
to the "plain meaning" rule, and not with reference to legislative
history (Part II); (2) that the VER phrase be a term-of-art,
subject to uniform interpretation in light of certain general prin-
ciples (Part II); and (3) that the inquiry as to what is a "valid
existing right" is different than the inquiry as to what conse-
1977 ("SMCRA"), 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201, 1251-1254 (allows states to regulate the environ-
mental effects of coal mining on state and private lands if they can administer a
regulatory program according to federal standards); Squillace, Cooperative Federalism
Under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act: Is This Any Way to Run a
Government?, 87 W. VA. L. REv. 687 (1985); Comment, Cooperative Federalism and
Environmental Protection: The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977,
58 TU.ANE L. REV. 299 (1983).
See, e.g., The Stearns Co., 110 IBLA 345 (1989) (interpreting the phrase "subject
to valid existing rights" found in the federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1272 (e)); Northern Alaska Environmental Center v. Lujan,
872 F.2d 901 (9th Cir. 1989) (interpreting the phrase "subject to valid existing rights"
found in the Alaska National Interests Lands Conservation Act ("ANILCA"), 16 U.S.C.
§ 410hh-5).
6 See Barkeley and Albert, A Survey of Case Law Interpreting "Valid Existing
Rights"-Implications for Unpatented Mining Claims, 34 ROCKY Mr. MIN. L. INST. 9-
1 (1988) [hereinafter Barkeley and Albert]; Laitos and Westfall, Government Interference
with Private Interests in Public Resources, 11 H~Av. ENVT'L L. REV. 1, 19-22, 58-60
(1987); Note, Regulation and Land Withdrawals: Defining "Valid Existing Rights," 3
J. MIN. L. & PoL'Y 517 (1988).
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quences should follow from a federal law that makes its terms
"subject to" these rights (Parts III and IV).
I. VER LANGUAGE IN FEDERAL LAW
A. The Problem of Two Laws
The federal law-maker usually decides to include the VER
phrase in federal law when that law somehow affects private
interests in land or resources which have arisen earlier, under
another, separate law. There are, then, two different laws to
consider in virtually all VER controversies-(1) the earlier law,
under which the private interest originally came into existence,
and (2) the subsequent law, which contains a VER phrase be-
cause this law will operate to affect the pre-existing private
interest. The earlier law will be termed the "Source Law," as it
is the source of the legal interest that will later need VER
protection. The subsequent law will be referred to as the "VER
Law," because this is the law that includes the VER phrase.
1. Source Law
Source Law is usually federal. Under typical federal Source
Laws, private parties may acquire a variety of interests in a
broad spectrum of public lands and resources.7 These "interests"
provide the private interest-holder with a range of arguably
protectable rights, not all of which necessarily rise to the level
of property rights. For example, at one end of the spectrum,
federal Source Law may grant parties a patent (full fee title)
both to the surface land and subsurface minerals of a mining
7 Private parties may obtain interests in public lands under federal land disposal
statutes. See, e.g., the Preemption Act of 1841, ch. 16, §§ 10-15, 5 Stat. 453 (1841); the
Farmers Homestead Act of 1862, 43 U.S.C. § 161 (repealed 1976); the Timber Culture
Act of 1873, ch. 277, 17 Stat. 605 (1873); the Desert Land Act of 1877, 43 U.S.C. §
321; the Stock- Raising Homestead Act of 1916, 43 U.S.C. § 291 (repealed 1976); and
the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971 ("ANCSA"), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601,
1602(e).
Persons may acquire interests in public resources under federal resource allocation
statutes. See, e.g., the Mining Law of 1872, 30 U.S.C. § 22 (hard rock minerals), the
Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. § 181 (oil and gas), the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. § 1001, as amended by the Outer Continental Shelf Land
Amendments Act of 1978, 16 U.S.C. § 1456, 30 U.S.C. § 237, 43 U.S.C. § 1344
(offshore oil and gas), and the Federal Coal Leasing Act Amendments of 1975
("FCLAA"), 30 U.S.C. § 201 (coal).
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claim.8 Private parties may have a less complete right, if they
obtain less-than-fee property interests in the form of federal
leases, 9 unpatented mining claims,
10 right-of-ways," licenses,1
2
and permits. 3 At the other end of the spectrum, parties may
have an interest whose property status is altogether uncertain.
These include rights of possession good only against other min-
ing claimants, 14 or the inchoate right in the future to receive a
federal noncompetitive preference right coal lease if the holder
of coal prospecting permits has discovered coal in commercial
quantities prior to the passage of the 1975 Federal Coal Leasing
Act Amendments. 5 The key determination is whether this inter-
est is protectable property.
Source Law may also be state law, either statutory or com-
mon law. If a private interest in land or resources arises under
state law, the issue turns on the scope and extent of the property
interest. For example, if the private interest is a deed, contract,
lease, or conveyance which establishes a state-acknowledged legal
right to coal, it may be unclear whether this right also entails a
right to mine the coal by a particular technique, such as one
which requires extensive use of the surface.16
Source Laws must be either state law or federal statutory
law. The United States Constitution cannot be Source Law be-
cause the Constitution itself creates no property rights. Property
is what federal or state law says it is. 17 However, the U.S.
8 See 30 U.S.C. § 26 (hard rock minerals under the 1872 Mining Law).
I See 30 U.S.C. § 181 (oil, gas, and oil shale under the 1920 Mineral Leasing
Act).
jo See, supra note 8.
11 See the Ditch Right-of-Way Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-546 (amenditfg section
501 of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. § 1761)
(easements for water conveyance system across public lands).
2 See 16 U.S.C. § 797 (hydropower facility under the Federal Power Act).
,3 43 U.S.C. §§ 315b, 315c (grazing under the Taylor Grazing Act).
14 See Union Oil Co. v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337, 346-47 (1919) (discussing the doctrine
of pedis possessio, which protects a prospector exploring a claim from encroachment by
others).
" The FCLAA, Pub. L. No. 94-377, 90 Stat. 1083 (codified as amended at 30
U.S.C. § 201), effective 1976, repealed those provisions of the 1920 Mineral Leasing
Act, 30 U.S.C. § 181, allowing for prospecting permits and noncompetitive preference
right coal leasing. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Berklund, 609 F.2d 553
(D.C. Cir. 1979); Utah Intern. lne. v. Andrus, 488 F. Supp. 962, 967-69 (D. Utah 1979).
16 See Peabody Coal Co. V. Pasco, 452 F.2d 1126 (6th Cir. 1971); Martin v.
Kentucky Oak Mining Co., 429 S.W. 2d 395 (Ky. 1968).
,1 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
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Constitution's Fifth Amendment Takings Clause"' prevents fed-
eral or state Source Law from redefining property so as to
"transform private property into public property without com-
pensation. "19
2. VER Law
VER Law is federal law which affects private interests arising
under Source Law. VER Law uses, but does not define, the
VER phrase. 20 VER Law is adopted after, and applies to, private
interests that have already been created under Source Law. The
VER phrase inserted in the VER Law is intended to somehow
protect certain pre-existing private interests in lands and re-
sources which arise under Source Law from the retroactive op-
eration of the VER Law.
21
Federal VER Law usually substitutes a different administra-
tive or regulatory regime for the one in place at the time the
private interests were originally created. The new regime almost
always burdens pre-existing interests by changing applicable rules
for acquiring, retaining, or maintaining the interest. VER Law
is often intended to protect the environment, 22 conserve wilder-
ness, 23 plan for and manage public lands and resources, 24 with-
draw public lands or resources from private acquisition, 25 convey
'8 U.S. CONST., amend. V.
19 Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980). The
Takings Clause applies against states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
, The VER phrase appears in over 100 federal statutes. Barkeley and Albert,
supra note 6 at 9-6, n.7. In the United States Code, the VER phrase occurs most
frequently in Titles 16 (Conservation) and 43 (Public Lands) and 30 (Mineral Lands and
Mining). See Note, Regulation and Land Withdrawals: Defining "Valid Existing Rights,"
3 J. MIN. L. & POL'Y 517, 532 n.108 (1988).
2, The United States Congress and state legislatures have virtually unlimited au-
thority to retroactively regulate property interests in lands and resources. See United
States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985); Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1
(1976); Boesche v. Udall, 373 U.S. 472, 476-77 (1963); Texaco v. Short, 454 U.S. 516
(1982); Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legis-
lation, 73 HARV. L. REV. 692 (1960).
" See SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1201 (regulation of surface coal mining).
21 See the Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. § 1131; the Wild and Scenic Rivers
Act of 1978, 16 U.S.C § 1271.
11 See the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 ("FLPMA"), 43
U.S.C. § 1701.
See ANCSA, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 1610(a)(1) (withdrawing public lands surround-
ing Alaskan villages from all public appropriations).
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public lands to certain identified persons, 26 or create a different
scheme for disposal of public resources.2 7 VER Law is normally
statutory, but may also be by executive action. 2
B. The Effect of VER Law on Pre-Existing Interests
A VER Law may in two ways affect interests created by a
Source Law. First, a VER Law may limit the nature and number
of private interests in public lands or resources. It may do so
by altering the rules for acquisition of the interest, 29 or by either
extinguishing interests already acquired,30 or altogether with-
26 See ANCSA, 43 U.S.C. § 1601 (Alaska native corporations entitled to fee
conveyances of public lands).
17 See FCLAA, Pub. L. No. 94-377, 90 Stat. 1083 (1976) (codified as amended at
30 U.S.C. § 201) (alters the requirements that must be met before an applicant for a
federal coal lease may be granted a lease). See also Nevada Power Co., 36 IBLA 62
(June 30, 1978).
1 Executive action containing VER language most commonly takes the form of
executive withdrawals of public lands or resources. See Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1
(1965); Stockley v. United States, 260 U.S. 532 (1922); Cameron v. United States, 252
U.S. 450 (1920); State of Alaska, Dep't of Transportation v. First National Bank of
Anchorage, 689 P.2d 483 (Alaska 1984); Getches, Managing the Public Lands: the
Authority of the Executive to Withdraw Lands, 20 Pub. L. & Res. L. Dig. 10 (1983);
Note, Regulation and Land Withdrawals: Defining "Valid Existing Rights, " 3 J. MiN.
L. & POL'Y 517 (1988).
29 Statutory examples include: (i) changing the method by which legal interests in
energy fuels could be privately acquired, from a location-patent scheme to a leasing
system (see Mineral Leasing Act of 1920); (2) shifts in coal leasing from the 1920 Mineral
Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. § 181, which allowed noncompetitive "preference right" leases,
to the FCLAA of 1975, 30 U.S.C. § 201, requiring that federal coal leasing be by
competitive bid; and (3) placing offshore oil and gas under a federal leasing scheme by
the Outer Continental Shelf Land Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. § 1001, as amended by the
Outer Continental Shelf Land Amendment Act of 1978, 16 U.S.C. § 1456, 30 U.S.C. §
237, 43 U.S.C. § 1344.
Litigation examples include: (1) shifts from location- patent to leasing of oil shale
(see Hickel v. Oil Shale Corp., 400 U.S. 196 (1970)), on remand, Oil Shale Corp. v.
Morton, 370 F. Supp. 108 (D. Colo. 1973), on further proceedings, Oil Shale Corp. v.
Hodel, 611 F. Supp. 1181 (D. Colo. 1986); and (2) changes in rental and lease terms
for noncompetitive oil and gas leases (see Miller v. Udall, 317 F.2d 573 (D.C. Cir.
1963)).
" Examples of interests in public lands or resources abolished or "taken" by
subsequent federal law include formal condemnation (Lemmons v. United States, 496
F.2d 864, 869 (Ct. Cl. 1974)), physical invasion (Eyherabide v. United States, 345 F.2d
565, 567 (Ct. CI. 1965)), an open-ended suspension of drilling rights amounting to a
cancellation of an oil and gas lease (Union Oil v. Morton, 512 F.2d 743, 750-51 (9th
Cir. 1975)), withholding or denying access to resources that are the subject of the interest
(Foster v. United States, 607 F.2d 943, 950 (Ct. Cl. 1979)), defeating the interest-holder's
possessory rights (Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955) (occupancy
of land without government recognition of private ownership)), and depriving a applicant
for an interest of the opportunity to obtain the interest (Hannifin v. Morton, 444 F.2d
200, 202 (10th Cir. 1971)).
[VoL. 5:399
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drawing public lands or resources sought.3 Second, a VER Law
may adversely affect the use, enjoyment, and economic devel-
opment of interests acquired under a Source Law. It may affect
these interests by retroactive imposition of either new regulatory
requirements32 or conditions.33 In both situations, VER language
softens the blow of subsequently occurring federal action that
would otherwise defeat expectations or impose unforeseen bur-
dens.
VER Laws that prevent interest holders from acquiring or
retaining rights in public lands and resources find their consti-
tutional basis in the Property Clause of Article IV.3 4 The power
of Congress to legislate pursuant to the Property Clause is
"plenary" 35 and "without limitation. '3 6 VER Laws that regulate
1, Federal action (VER Law) can "withdraw" public lands and resources from the
operation of federal land and resources disposal statutes (Source Law) in one of two
ways. First, federal law can confer withdrawal authority on the executive branch, which
can then withdraw certain public lands and resources and thereby deprive interest-holders
of that which is withdrawn (unless, of course, the withdrawal contains VER language).
See Payne v. New Mexico, 255 U.S. 367 (1921); Payne v. Central Pacific Railway Co.,
255 U.S. 228 (1921); Wyoming v. United States, 255 U.S. 489 (1921); Stockley v. United
States, 260 U.S. 532 (1923); Wisenak v. Andrus, 471 F. Supp. 1004 (D. Alaska 1979).
FLPMA now governs executive exercise of withdrawal authority. FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. §
1714. See Wheatley, Withdrawals Under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act,
21 ARIZ. L. REV. 311 (1979).
Second, the federal government can withdraw lands and resources from the oper-
ation of Source Laws by conveying the fee or mineral estate out of the public domain.
These conveyances have in turn occurred under (1) the Alaska Statehood Act, 72 Stat.
339, 340, and ANILCA, 43 U.S.C. § 1635(c); (2) ANCSA, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1610(a), 1613(e)
& (f); and (3) school land grants and indemnity selections (see Shearer, Federal Land
Grants to the States: An Advocate's Dream; A Title Examiner's Nightmare, 14 ROCKY
MTN. MiN. L. INST. 185, 204 (1968)).
11 Two federal regulatory statutes have generated the most contention about the
nature and scope of VER. These are SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201, 1272(e), and FLPMA,
43 U.S.C. § 1701 (the VER phrase is found at section 710(h), codified at 43 U.S.C. §
1701 note). For exemplary case law, see In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation
Litigation, 14 Env't Rep. Cases (BNA) 1083 (D.D.C. 1980), aff'd, 653 F. 2d 514; Otter
Creek Coal Co., 224 Ct. Cl. 697 (1980), on further proceedings, 231 Ct. Cl. 878 (1982)
(SMCRA); Utah v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 995, 1010-11 (D. Utah 1979) (FLPMA).
11 Examples of conditions subsequent are (1) a five-year limitation period on a
mining claimant's opportunity to patent lands conveyed under ANCSA, 43 U.S.C. §
1621(c) (see Alaska Miners v. Andrus, 662 F.2d 577, 579-80 (9th Cir. 1981)), (2) the
recordation requirements of FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. § 1744 (see U.S. v. Locke, 471 U.S.
84 (1985)); Nequoia Ass'n v. Dept. of Interior, 626 F. Supp. 827 (D. Utah 1985)), and
(3) recordation requirements of the Mining in the Parks Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1907.
U.S. CONST. Art. IV, § 3, cl.2.
3' California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock, 480 U.S. 572-73 (1987).
36 Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539 (1976); Camfield v.United States, 167
U.S. 518, 525 (1897).
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or impose conditions subsequent on existing interests usually
find their constitutional authority in the Commerce Clause of
Article 1. a7 Like the Property Clause, the power of Congress to
legislate pursuant to the Commerce Clause is "plenary" 3 - and
"acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the
Constitution." 3 9 Because federal VER Laws have constitutional
power to affect existing private interests with near impunity,
checks on the scope of this power must come from one of two
places-(l) specific limitations on the exercise of federal power
found in the Constitution (e.g., the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment), or (2) protections added to the VER Law by the
political process, such as the VER phrase.
C. Choices Available to Federal Lawmakers
When a federal lawmaker (Congress or the executive branch)
decides to make federal law regarding lands and resources, that
decision inevitably raises the issue of whether the federal law
should apply to pre-existing interests in lands and resources. The
lawmaker has the choice of addressing this issue explicitly, am-
biguously, or not at all.
Explicit recognition involves including a provision in the law
expressly stating the lawmaker's intent about the applicability of
the new law to the pre-existing interests. This manifestation of
intent is most clearly articulated in a "grandfather" or "sav-
ings" clause exempting certain defined interests from the new
law. 40 Inclusion of a VER phrase in the new law results in
ambiguous recognition and protection of existing interests. Since
U.S. CONST. Art. 1, § 8, cl.3.
38 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheaton) 1, 196-197, 6 L. Ed. 23 (1824).
19 Id. See also United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111 (1942); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
The Tenth Amendment constitutional limitation on the exercise of the commerce power
was effectively removed in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469
U.S. 528 (1985).
1 SMCRA contains a grandfather clause that exempts from an unsuitability des-
ignation "lands on which surface coal mining operations are being conducted on the
date of enactment of this Act, or under a permit issued pursuant to this Act, or where
substantial legal and financial commitments in such operation were in existence prior to
Jan. 4, 1977." SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1272(a)(6). FLPMA requires the U.S. Bureau of
Land Management (BLM) to examine BLM lands for wilderness characteristics "subject,
however, to the continuation of existing mining and grazing uses and mineral leasing in
the manner and degree in which the same was being conducted on Oct. 21, 1976." 43
U.S.C. § 1782(c).
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the words "valid existing rights" are never defined in the VER
Law, the task of interpretation falls on the executive branch
(usually the Department of the Interior),4 or the courts.4 2 Fi-
nally, non-recognition of pre-existing interests occurs when the
new law makes no mention of them. In such cases, courts may
interpret the new law so as to protect prior rights.
43
Owners of pre-existing interests in land or resources affected
by a new federal law are obviously best served if the law itself
expressly spells out its applicability toward these interests, as in
a grandfather clause." But if the federal law contains either the
standard ambiguous VER phrase, or no language at all protect-
ing existing interests, then one must rely on implementing agen-
cies and reviewing courts to sort out the retroactive applicability
of the new law (and the intent of the law-maker). If the new
law contains no protective language, then that law will most
likely be found to apply to all existing interests, but only up to
the point where that application would constitute a "taking" of
4 See generally Appeal of Bedell, 86 Interior Dec. 60 (Jan. 31, 1979) (open-to-
entry leases issued prior to the passage of ANCSA are VER); Appeal of Choggiung, 86
Interior Dec. 392, (Aug. 17, 1979) (permits transferred from one state agency to another
are not third-party VER protected by ANCSA). See also Solicitor's Opinion M-36910
(Supp.), 88 Interior Dec. 909, (Oct. 5, 1981).
,1 See Hinton v. Udall, 364 F.2d 676 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (order by Secretary of
Interior withdrawing lands subject to "valid existing rights" may be interpreted to
protect from the withdrawal sub-surface mineral rights); Peterson v. Dep't of Interior,
510 F. Supp. 777 (D. Utah 1981) (an applicant for a preference right coal lease who
obtained a prospecting permit and applied for an extension to the permit, has a valid
existing right, protected by FCLAA, to have the merits of the application considered
under pre-FCLAA law).
, See City of Angoon v. Marsh, 749 F.2d 1413 (9th Cir. 1984). "[A] retrospective
operation will not be given a statute which interferes with antecedent rights . . . unless
such be 'the unequivocal and inflexible impact of the terms, and the manifest intention
of the legislature."' Coastal States Energy Co. v. Watt, 629 F. Supp. 9, 20 (D. Utah
1985), quoting Greene v. United States, 376 U.S. 149, 160 (1964).
- Even grandfather clauses can give rise to extensive litigation. See Rocky Moun-
tain Oil & Gas v. Watt, 696 F.2d 734, 747 (10th Cir. 1985); Utah v. Andrus, 486 F.
Supp. 995, 1006 (D. Utah 1979); Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305, 335 (D.C. Cal.
1985); Solicitor's Opinion M-36916, 86 Interior Dec. 86, 111-12, 114-15 (Feb. 13, 1979)
(construing FLPMA's grandfather clause excepting from the statute's non- impairment
standard certain pre-FLPMA activities and uses, 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c)); National Wildlife
Federation v. Hodel, 839 F.2d 694, 747-48 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (construing SMCRA's
grandfather clause exempting certain pre-existing lands from unsuitability designation,
30 U.S.C. § 1272(a)(6)); Aleknagik Natives, Ltd. v. United States, 635 F. Supp. 1497-
98 (D. Alaska 1985, aff'd 806 F. 2d 924 (9th Cir. 1986)) (construing a grandfather
clause in FLPMA preserving "valid . . . land use right[s] or authorization[s] [that were
already] existing ..... . 90 Stat. 2786, 2789-90, FLPMA section 701(a)).
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the property interest. 45 If the new law contains VER language,
then three questions face implementing agencies, reviewing courts,
and attorneys representing pre-existing affected interests:
1. What interests are meant to be included as "valid existing
rights?"
2. What consequences should follow if an interest is deemed to
be a "valid existing right?"
3. Who should decide the first two questions? 46
II. INTERPRETING THE VER PHRASE
Standard VER language is exceptionally simple and straight-
forward. It provides that the VER Law shall be "subject to"
certain interests qualifying as "valid existing rights." Since the
VER Law containing the VER phrase does not elsewhere explain
or define the meaning of the phrase, one must turn to other
sources other than the VER Law to discern the intent of the
law-maker who included the VER phrase. One can review (1)
41 See Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 752 F.2d 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1985), on
further proceedings, 18 Cl. Ct. 394 (1989); Skaw v. United States, 740 F.2d 932 (Fed.
Cir. 1984); Foster v. United States, 607 F.2d 943 (Ct. Cl. 1979); Utah v. Andrus, 486
F. Supp. 995, 1011 (D. Utah 1979). An interest acquired from the United States is most
likely protected from the operation of a subsequent law if it is "vested." See Shepley
v. Cowan, 91 U.S. 330, 338 (1876).
- The federal law-maker may choose to delegate resolution of the VER question
to agencies, courts, or states. Delegation to states is appropriate if the land or resource
affected by the federal VER Law is created under state law. See legislative history of
SMCRA, which seems to defer to state law on the subject of defining VER on non-
federal lands. H.R. Rep. 189, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 85 (1975); H.R. Rep. 95-218, 95th
Cong. 1st Sess. at 184 (1977); H.R. Rep. No. 493, 95th Cong. Ist Sess. 105-106 (1977).
See also Dernbach, Pennsylvania's Implementation of the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act: An Assessment of How "Cooperative Federalism" Can Make State
Regulatory Programs More Effective, 19 J. OF LAW REFORM 903 (1986); Note, Coop-
erative Federalism and Environmental Protection: The Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977, 58 TuLANE L. REv. 299 (1983).
Delegation to states creates three sets of problems. First, the state VER definition
may not be consistent with how the applicable federal agency interprets the federal VER
Law. See Illinois South Project v. Hodel, 844 F.2d 1286, 1289 (7th Cir. 1988). Second,
if states are delegated authority to interpret VER language, and if the state VER
definition turns on whether a state authority believes the VER Law would unconstitu-
tionally "take" state-created property interests, then questions arise about whether state
administrators are capable of making constitutional determinations. See 48 Fed. Reg.
41312, 41313-16, 41349, 41348-49 (1983), 30 C.F.R. § 761.5 (1986); McFerrin and
Whitman, Valid Existing Rights and the Constitution: 1983 Regulatory Changes, 87 W.
VA. L. REv. 647, 660-61 (1985). Third, the state VER definition may not violate the
United States Constitution. Sunday Creek Coal Co. v. Hodel, No. C-2-88-0416 (D. So.
Dist. E. Div. Ohio, June 2, 1988).
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evidence of intent external to the VER Law, (2) the plain mean-
ing of the words of the VER phrase, and (3) the likely political
reality driving the decision to include the VER phrase in the
VER Law.
A. External Evidence of Intent
If one seeks to discover the intent of an ambiguously worded
statutory phrase, the most logical source is the legislative history
of that phrase. This history is often buried in committee hearing
transcripts, committee reports, and floor debates. The legislative
history of VER provisions is often elusive. But sometimes the
VER expression is the topic of a committee report or floor
debate, and in such cases it has been used by agencies 47 and
courts4 interpreting VER language.
However, the problem with relying on legislative history is
that not all legislators voting on the bill are aware of, or even
care about, committee reports, floor speeches, and other indicia
of legislative intent. When a statute is passed, one cannot assume
that all those voting for it are reflecting the intent found in the
legislative history. All one can safely assume is that those voting
for the law were voting in favor of the text of the statute, and
the words of the VER phrase.
49
Another tool available to those wishing to discover the intent
of the law-maker is the interpretation given to the ambiguous
phrase by the agency charged with its administration. The ad-
ministrative interpretation is held to a standard of reasonable-
ness: "The administrative interpretation need only be a reasonable
" The Secretary of Interior relied on the legislative history of ANCSA in construing
what interests were meant to be included as valid existing rights excepted from convey-
ances made under the Act to native corporations. See Secretarial Order No. 3016, 85
Interior Dec. 1, 6 (Dec. 14, 1977).
41 See Meridian Land & Mineral Co. v. Hodel, 843 F. 2d 340, 343-47 (9th Cir.
1988); National Wildlife Federation v. Hodel, 839 F.2d 694, 751 (D.C. Cir. 1988);
Aleknagik Natives, Ltd. v. United States, 806 F.2d 924, 927 (9th Cir. 1986); Hinton v.
Udall, 364 F.2d 676 (D.C. Cir. 1966) Miller v. Udall, 317 F.2d 573, 576-76 (D.C. Cir.
1963); Peterson v. Dep't of Interior, 510 F. Supp. 777 (D. Utah 1981); State of Utah
v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 995, 1004-05 (D. Utah 1979).
41 See generally Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 191-92 (1988) (Scalia,
concurring); U.S. Taylor, 108 S. Ct. 2413, 2423 (1988) (Scalia, concurring).
Also, sometimes the legislative history of a statute containing VER language simply
and not helpfully defines a VER as a "valid existing right." See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No.
554, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., at 5 (1986) (defining VER language in the Ditch Right-of-
Way Act of 1986, H.R. 2921).
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one to be accepted though there may be another equally reason-
able interpretation." 50
However, judicial deference to agency interpretation is not
uniformly approved by the United States Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court has implied that courts may substitute their
interpretation of a statute for that of an agency whenever,
"[elmploying traditional tools of statutory construction," they
are able to reach a conclusion as to the proper interpretation of
a statute.5 When a court construes an ambiguous statutory
phrase, and Congress does not thereafter amend the statute, a
rule of statutory construction is that one may then presume that
Congress intended the phrase to have that judicially established
meaning.5 2 This presumption appears even stronger when a court
case interpreting an ambiguous statutory phrase appears some-
where in the legislative history of the statute.
Unfortunately, one cannot ever assume that congressional
failure to change a law after a court case should imply congres-
sional approval of the judicial opinion construing the statute.
Congressional inaction may be due to many reasons other than
approval of the status quo.53 And, as for the relevance of cases
inserted in a statute's legislative history, one might consider this
observation by Justice Scalia:
As anyone familiar with modern-day drafting of congressional
committee reports is well aware, the references to the cases
were inserted, at best by a committee staff member on his or
her own initiative, and at worst by a committee staff member
at the suggestion of a lawyer-lobbyist; and the purpose of
those references was not primarily to inform the Members of
SO Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1087 (10th Cir. 1988), quoting Rocky
Mtn. Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Watt, 696 F.2d 734, 745 (10th Cir. 1982), citing Udall v.
Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965). See also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984); Commodity Futures Trading Com'n v.
Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 844-45 (1986).
51 Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446
(1987).
52 See Tafoya v. United States, 748 F.2d 1389, 1392 (10th Cir.1984); Sea-Land
Serv., Inc. v. Federal Maritime Com'n, 404 F.2d 824, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
11 See Johnson v. Transportation Agency of Santa Clara County, California, et
al, 480 U.S. 616, 672 (1987) (Scalia, dissenting):
[C]ongressional failure to act [may] represent .. .inability to agree upon
how to alter the status quo, unawareness of the status quo, indifference
to the status quo, or even political cowardice.
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Congress what the bill meant, but rather to influence judicial
construction.1
4
B. The Plain Meaning of the VER Words
If sources external to the VER phrase regarding the law-
maker's intent are of questionable reliability, then perhaps the
best indication of the intended meaning of the VER phrase is
the language and words of the phrase itself. Reference to the
VER words is consistent with the primary rule of statutory
construction, which is that the "starting point must be the
language employed by Congress.""
This rule, sometimes known as the "plain meaning rule,"
holds that "legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary
meaning of the words used." '5 6 Indeed, in one of the rare in-
stances when the United States Supreme Court considered the
meaning of a VER phrase, the Court's interpretation was guided
by the plain meaning rule.1
7
If one applies the plain meaning rule to the standard VER
phrase, one arrives at three conclusions. First, by including in
the VER Law the VER phrase, the law-maker intended to offer
some measure of protection to a class of pre-existing interests.
If the lawmaker had not wanted to protect any interests, then
no protective language would have been added to the law.
Second, by choosing the VER phrase, and not a more specific
grandfather or savings clause, one can assume that the law-
maker intended to accomplish something different than would
have been the case had the protective clause specifically listed
all the interests protected from the law. Such a listing necessarily
narrows the scope of the exception, because only those interests
Blanchard v. Bergeron, 109 S. Ct. 939, 947 (1989) (Scalia concurring).
Buettner v. Kavilco, Inc. 860 F.2d 341, 343 (9th Cir. 1988), quoting from Reiter
v. Sonotone Corp. 442 U.S. 330, 337 (1979). See also Consumer Product Safety Com'n
v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980); Tyonek Native Corp. v. Sec. of
Interior, 836 F.2d 1237, 1239 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Taylor, 802 F.2d 1108,
1113 (9th Cir. 1986).
,1 Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962). See also Unexcelled Chemical
Corp. v. United States, 345 U.S. 59, 64 (1953); United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689,
693 (1948).
11 See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recl. Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 296 n.37
(1981): "[Appellees'l interpretation of the [VER phrase in SMCRA, § 522(e)] is not
compelled by ... the statutory language .... "
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expressed in the grandfather or savings clause are included within
the clause's protection."
By contrast, VER language "saves" or "grandfathers" eve-
rything deemed to be a "valid existing right." By using a phrase
which has been used hundreds of times in public land law59 one
can assume that the law-maker knew that the phrase was a term-
of-art, with some generally understood meaning. 60 It can also be
assumed that the VER phrase was selected because it would
likely include within its scope more interests than those included
in a more specific grandfather or savings clause.
6'
Finally, application of the plain meaning rule to the VER
phrase reveals that the phrase has two separate parts. One part
of the phrase articulates those interests meant to be included
within the phrase's protection-those that are "valid existing
rights." One can thus presume that for an interest arising under
a Source Law to be a VER, that interest must meet three
conditions. It must be a "right"; it must be a right "existing"
at the time of the VER Law's effective date; and it must be an
existing right that is "valid" under laws applicable to the right
prior to the VER Law's effective date. Each of these conditions
will be examined in Part III.
The other part of the VER phrase reveals the law-maker's
intent concerning the extent of protection afforded those inter-
ests that are VER. That intent is expressed in the words that
make the VER Law "subject to" VER. The meaning of "subject
to" will be examined in Part IV.62
11 See, e.g., Cooley v. Federal Regulatory Commission, 843 F.2d 1464, 1470 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (reviewing a grandfather clause providing that the statute containing the clause
"shall not be construed as affecting any permit or valid existing right of way granted
prior to [the statute's effective date]"); Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Ass'n v. Watt,
696 F.2d 734, 739 (10th Cir. 1982) (construing a grandfather clause making the statute
"subject, however, to the continuation of existing mining and grazing uses and mineral
leasing ....").
Grandfather and savings clauses are intended to avoid hardship by saving accrued
rights or interests from the operation of a new rule. 2A SANDS, SUTHERLAND'S STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION 148 (4th ed. 1984 rev.).
'9 See note 20, supra.
60 See Note, Regulation of Land Withdrawals: Defining "Valid Existing Rights,"
3 J. MIN. L. & POL'Y 517, 532 (1988).
11 See Aleknagik Natives Ltd. v. United States, 806 F.2d 924, 927 (9th Cir. 1986);
Kile v. Belisle, 759 P.2d 1292, 1298 (Alaska 1988); Paug-Vik, Inc. v. Wards Cove
Packing Co. 633 P.2d 1015, 1020, n.15 (Alaska 1981). See also Solicitor's Opinion M-
36910 (Supp.) 88 I.D. 909 (Oct. 5, 1981) (interpreting "valid existing rights" as including
more than "vested rights").
11 Both the Interior Department and the courts have assumed that determining the
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C. Political Reality and the Meaning of the VER Phrase
An analysis of the statute's plain meaning should not end
the inquiry into the intent of the VER phrase. One can also
make certain assumptions about the likely practical reasons for
inclusion of the phrase in a federal law (VER Law) which will
impact private interests in lands and resources. One can assume,
for example, that federal law-makers are aware of certain polit-
ical realities that are inevitably associated with such a law. Since
these political realities likely motivate the lawmaker to include
the VER phrase, its meaning can in part be ascertained with
reference to them.
Because the VER Law would otherwise impact, and burden
existing interests, and because the VER phrase makes the VER
Law "subject to" certain "rights," it appears that the lawmaker
intends to protect certain legitimate property interests from the
operation of the VER Law. The exact nature of the interests
will be discussed below, in Part III. One can surmise, however,
that the lawmaker probably intends the VER phrase to be ap-
plied "generously, ' 63 and to a wide array of interests, ranging
from expectations 64 to vested property rights.
65
The extent of protection encompassed by the "subject to"
language will be the topic of Part IV. As a threshold matter, it
is reasonable to presume that the lawmaker intends for the VER
phrase to prevent the VER Law from causing a taking of prop-
erty without just compensation. 66
existence of a VER is a separate question from whether, and the extent to which, those
rights are to be affected by the VER Law. See Solicitor's Opinion, M-36910 (Supp.), 88
I.D. 909, 913 (Oct. 5, 1981); Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305, 334-35 (D.C. Cal.
1985).
61 See Solicitor's Opinion, 55 I.D. 205, 207, 210 (1935).
" See Aleknagik Natives Ltd. v. United States, 806 F.2d 924, 927 (9th Cir. 1986).
' See National Wildlife Federation v. Hodel, 839 F.2d 694, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(SMCRA's VER phrase intended to prevent the law from infringing on "valid property
rights"); Solicitor's Opinion, M-36910 (Supp.), 88 I.D. 909, 911-12 (Oct. 5, 1981).
" See Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450 (1920); National Wildlife Federation
v. Hodel, 839 F.2d 694, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (SMCRA's VER phrase intended to prevent
takings); Utah v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 995, 1011 (D. Utah 1979) (FLPMA's VER
phrase intended to prevent an overly restrictive application of the law which could be
deemed to constitute a taking).
Of course, a VER phrase may do more than just protect against takings. If a VER
phrase is only intended to prevent takings, it would be limited to "rights" that are
deemed "property" within the fifth amendment. Compare Arnold v. Morton, 529 F.2d
1101 (9th Cir. 1976) (application for a lease is not property) with Lemmons v. United
States, 496 F.2d 864, 873 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (leasehold interest is property) and Skaw v.
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The motivation behind the decision to include the VER phrase
is more than just a fear that the VER Law might unconstitu-
tionally "take" existing property. Because the creator of the
VER Law is subject to political pressures (especially if the law-
maker is the United States Congress), there is incentive to ensure
that the new law does not appear to operate unfairly upon
existing interests. Notions of fairness become particularly rele-
vant when the VER phrase is applied to prevent the VER Law
from either destroying rights already earned under a Source
Law, 67 or depriving parties who have relied upon previous agency
practice from acquiring interests.
68
Finally, in addition to preventing takings or the appearance
of unfairness, the VER phrase is possibly intended to preserve
the status quo for those interests pre-dating the VER Law.
Support for this view is found in the word "existing" in the
standard VER phrase, in Solicitor's Opinions of the Interior
Department, 69 and in case law. 70 To the extent the VER Law
United States, 740 F.2d 932, 940 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (unpatented mining claim is property).
Since property interests are already protected by the Constitution, additional statutory
protection may be redundant. Therefore, it may be that the purpose of the VER phrase
is to protect non-property.
61 See United States ex rel. McLennan v. Wilbur, 283 U.S. 414 (1931); Payne v.
Central Pacific Railway Co., 255 U.S. 228, 233-37 (1921); Payne v. New Mexico, 255
U.S. 367, 371-72 (1921); Williams v. Brening, 51 Interior Dec. 225 (1925); Louis J.
Hobbs, 77 Interior Dec. 5, 7-8 (1970).
See Stockley v. United States, 260 U.S. 532, 544 (1923); Peterson v. Dep't of
Interior, 510 F. Supp. 777, 783 (D. Utah 1981); Peabody Coal Co. v. Andrus, 477 F.
Supp. 120, 123 (D. Wyo. 1979); Asarco, Inc., IBLA 83-14, 83-305, 83-400, 72 IBLA
110 (1983); Solicitor's Opinion, 55 Interior Dec. 205, 210 (Feb. 8, 1935). See also
Barkeley and Albert, supra note 6 at 74-81, 83-95 (arguing that VER analysis is similar
to the rationale behind equitable estoppel and the vested rights doctrine); Laitos and
Westfall, Government Interference with Private Interests in Public Resources, I I HARV.
ENVT'L L. REV. 1, 12 n.65 (1987).
- Solicitor's Opinion, M-36910 (Supp.), 88 I.D. 909, 913 (Oct.5, 1981) (FLPMA's
VER permits the holder of "an oil and gas lease or a right-of-way authorization issued
prior to the enactment of FLPMA [to] develop the leasehold or right-of-way to the
extent authorized by the issuance or approval document"). The Solicitor's views were
later ratified in Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1087-88 (10th Cir. 1988).
10 Certain cases involving the VER phrase stand for the proposition that the phrase
does not create new rights or obligations; its purpose is to preserve existing conditions.
See Evangelinos v. Div. of Reclamation, 1989 Westlaw 109497 (Ohio App. 1989); Cogar
v. Sommerville, 379 S.E.2d 764, 769 (W. Va. 1989); Battese v. Apache County, 630
P.2d 1027, 1030-31 (Ariz. 1981); Beard Oil Co., 111 IBLA 191 (1989).
The legislative history of the FCLAA and SMCRA also suggest that the VER
phrase in those two statutes was meant to prevent a change in the legal status of those
interests deemed VER. See S. Rep. No. 296, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1975) (VER in
the FCLAA included because "the committee intends to maintain the status quo with
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would otherwise change rules in place affecting interests which
existed prior to the passage of the law, the VER phrase may be
intended to immunize those rules from the effect of the new
VER Law.
III. THE NATURE OF A "VALID EXISTING RIGHT"
To constitute a VER, all three components of the VER
phrase (valid-existing-right) must be satisfied. If any component
is missing, the interest sought to be protected from the VER
Law is without a necessary condition precedent to achieve VER
status.
A. What is a "right"?
A private interest in land or resources qualifies as a right if,
under state or federal law (Source Law), that interest is consid-
ered property. 7' An interest is property if it is protected by the
"property" provision of the Due Process Clause. 72 A number
of interests that are "property" interests have been given VER
protection .
7
Private property interests in land or resources are created,
and their scope initially defined, not by the Constitution, but by
an independent source-typically federal statutes or state law.
74
Federal or state Source Law not only create private property
respect to any such rights, and not to enlarge or diminish them in any way"); S. Rep.
No. 128, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1977) (with SMCRA, "VER must be preserved, and
the [committee] has no intention whatsoever, by any provision of this bill, to change
such rights.")
11 See Solicitor's Opinion No. M-36910 (Supp.), supra note 69; Forbes v. Gracey,
94 U.S. 762, 767 (1876); Cole v. Ralph, 252 U.S. 294-95 (1919); Hubbard v. Brown,
785 F.2d 1183 (Cal. 1990).
n See Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305, 327 (D.C. Cal.1985).
" E.g., severed mineral estates (see Ainzley v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 394, 397-
99 (1985)); public land grants to states (see Tetlin Native Corp. V. State, 759 P.2d 528
(Alaska 1988)); right-of-ways (see Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d at 1068, 1085-88 (10th
Cir. 1988)); leases (see Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. Kerr McGee Corp., 492 F.2d 878,
882 (10th Cir. 1974)); homesteads (see Stockley v. United States, 260 U.S. 532, 536
(1922)); and unpatented mining claims (see Skaw v. United States, 740 F.2d 932, 935-
36 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
14 Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 525 (1981) (quoting Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). Rights qualifying as VERs can also arise under treaties
and memorandum agreements between countries. See West Indian Co. v. Government
of Virgin Islands, 643 F. Supp. 869, 873- 75 (D. Virgin Islands 1986), aff'd 844 F.2d
1007, 1018 (3d Cir. 1988).
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rights that may qualify as VER, Source Law may also justify
later regulation, limitation, or conditioning of the VER. 5
1. Rights Arising Under Federal Law
If an interest is created by federal law, it may or may not
rise to the stature of a "right" protected by a VER phrase.
Whether an interest is such a right will depend upon the exact
nature of the interest, and whether the interest is considered
property. Private interests in federal public lands and resources
may be roughly classified in six categories. Most, but not all, of
these categories of interests qualify both as property, and as
"rights" within the meaning of the VER phrase.
"Vested rights" are VER rights. A private interest vests when
the private party either has a fee title from the federal govern-
ment, 76 or equitable rights to a fee title. 7 A vested right removes
from the United States the power to deprive the holder of the
right to the fee title.78 Some courts have held that vested rights
may be present in less than fee interests (e.g., an oil and gas
lease)79 and validly acquired rights to a less than fee interest
(e.g., a preference right coal lease).80
"Non-vested protectable property rights" are not vested be-
cause they are less than fee interests. But they are rights because
they confer on the holder a property right which is considered
a VER right. These include federal mineral leases,81 oil and gas
leases,"2 coal leases,83 permits and licenses,8 4 right-of-ways, 5 and
71 See Copper Valley Machine Works, Inc. v. Andrus, 653 F.2d 595, 601 (9th Cir.
1981); Portland General Electric Co. v. Federal Power Com'n, 328 F.2d 165, 173 (9th
Cir. 1964); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Clark, 631 F. Supp. 29 (D. Colo. 1985).
" See Shepley v. Cowan, 91 U.S. 330, 338 (1876) (land); 30 U.S.C. §§ 28-29
(minerals).
17 See Wyoming v. United States, 255 U.S. 489, 501 (1921).
78 2 AM. L. OF MINING §§ 6.01 (2d ed. 1986).
19 See Union Oil v. Morton, 512 F.2d 743, 750 (9th Cir. 1975).
10 See NRDC v. Berklund, 609 F.2d at 557 n.16 (D.C. Cir.1980).
81 See Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 492 F.2d 878 (10th Cir.
1974).
,2 See Union Oil Company of California v. Morton, 512 F.2d 743, 750-51 (9%h
Cir.1975); Colorado Open Space Council, IBLA 81-970, 73 IBLA 226 (1983).
See NRDC v. Berklund, 609 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
" See Portland General Elective Co. v. Federal Power Com'n, 328 F.2d 165 (9th
Cir. 1964) (license); Homer Smelser v. Bureau of Land Management, IBLA 83-227, 75
IBLA 44 (1983) (grazing permit); Appeal of Kodiak Island Setnetters, 85 Interior Dec.
200 (June 12, 1978) (special use permit).
" See Foster v. United States, 607 F.2d 943, 945 (Ct. C1.1979); Nelbro Packing
Co., 88 Interior Dec. 352 (Mar. 9, 1981).
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access rights.8 6 Because the United States retains title to the
severed property interest,8 7 non-vested protectable property rights
may be subsequently regulated and their value diminished for a
proper governmental purpose. 8
"Protected possessory interests" are VER rights which arise
because the interest-holder has fulfilled certain statutory condi-
tions precedent which give the holder the right to the use and
exclusive possession of specified public lands or resources. The
interest acquired is possessory in nature, and fee title remains
with the United States. The most common type of protected
possessory interest is a perfected, but unpatented, mining claim
under the 1872 Mining Law. 9 An unpatented mining claim
constitutes a VER which is recognized by statutes that otherwise
extinguish such claims. 90 Despite VER status, holders of unpa-
tented mining claims may be affected by subsequently imposed
regulations91 and conditions. 92 They may also be deprived of
their right to obtain a patent from the United States. 93 Another
type of protected possessory interest is a pending but unperfected
homestead entry. 94
"Non-discretionary entitlements" are VER rights which au-
tomatically come into existence when applicants for a vested
right, a non-vested protectable property right, or a protected
possessory interest fulfill all statutory conditions for the issuance
" Alaska Public Easement Defense Fund v. Andrus, 435 F. Supp.664 (D. Alaska
1977).
8' See Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1965).
See Copper Valley Machine Works, Inc. v. Andrus, 653 F.2d 595, 601 (D.C.
Cir. 1981).
19 See Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Krushnic, 280 U.S. 306, 316-17 (1930); Best
v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334 (1963); Forbes v. Gracey, 94 U.S. at 767
(1876); Lemmons v. United States, 496 F.2d 864, 873 (Ct. CI. 1974).
o Henry W. Waterfield, IBLA 152, IBLA 270 (1983); Oregon Portland Cement
Co., 88 Interior Dec. 760, 771 (Aug. 25, 1981); Challenge to Validity of Mining Claims
in National Parks, Solicitor's Opinion, 53 Interior Dec. 491 (1931).
A valid unpatented mining claim also gives the holder of the claim a VER to
extralateral rights. See 30 U.S.C. § 26; Swoboda v. Pala Mining Co., 844 F.2d 654,
657-58 (9th Cir. 1988).
" See Boesche v. Udall, 373 U.S. 472, 477-78 (1963); Trustees for Alaska v. EPA,
749 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1984).
92 See United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 105 (1985).
91 See Alaska Miners v. Andrus, 662 F.2d 577 (9th Cir. 1981); Freese v. United
States, 639 F.2d 754 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
" See Knapp v. Alexander Co., 237 U.S. 162, 167 (1915) (an entryman "has a
substantial inceptive title"); Assiniboine Sioux Tribes v. Nordwick, 378 F.2d 426 (9th
Cir. 1967).
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of the right sought. Four types of entitlements may be charac-
terized as non-discretionary: (1) noncompetitive preference coal
lease applications filed before passage of the Federal Coal Leas-
ing Act Amendments of 1975 (FCLAA), where the applicant has
met the pre-FCLAA statutory test for lease issuance, 95 (2) allot-
ment applications in Alaska based on either occupancy or seg-
regation of the site from the public domain, % (3) selections of
indemnity lands made in lieu of lands otherwise disposed of,
97
and (4) homestead entries. 98 Although these rights are inchoate,
they are VER rights because they were created without an inter-
vening discretionary act by an executive official once applicable
statutory conditions are met.
"Possessory rights," based upon mere use or occupancy of
lands, are not VER rights. They give the holder a right to prevent
third parties from interfering with the possessory interest, 99 or a
privilege to purchase lands in preference to others.' °0 However,
because they do not give the holder a right to a legal interest
from the United States, they are not VER,' 0  and the United
States may terminate them. 10 2
"Applications" for a property interest from the federal gov-
ernment give no VER rights to the applicant, 0 other than the
right to have the application fairly considered under applicable
15 See NRDC v. Berklund, 609 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Utah Int'l v. Andrus,
488 F. Supp. 962, 969 (D. Utah 1979).
6 See Aleknagik Natives Ltd. v. United States, 806 F.2d 924, 927 (9th Cir. 1986);
Aguilar v. United States, 474 F. Supp. 840, 842 (D. Alaska 1979); United States v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 F. Supp. 1009, 1022-23 (D. Alaska 1977); Alaska v. Marcia
K. Thorson, IBLA 83-191, 76 IBLA 264 (1983); State of Alaska/Golden Valley Electric
Ass'n, 110 IBLA 224 (1989).
See Payne v. Central Pacific Railway Co., 255 U.S. 228 (1921); Payne v. New
Mexico, 255 U.S. 367 (1921).
98 See Stockley v. United States, 260 U.S. 532 (1923); State, Dept. of Transp. v.
First Nat. Bank, 689 P.2d 483, 486 (Alaska 1984); Resource Investments v. State, Dept.
of Transp. 687 P.2d 280, 281-82 (Alaska 1984); State v. Alaska Land Title Ass'n, 667
P.2d 714, 724 (Alaska 1983).
" Union Oil Co. V. Smith, 249 U.S. 337, 337-46 (1919) (pedis possessio rights);
see also Alaska Mines v. Andrus, 662 F.2d 577, at 579 (9th Cir. 1981).
110 See Shepley v. Cowan, 91 U.S. 330, 338 (1876); Rowe v.United States, 464 F.
Supp. 1060, 1077 (D. Alaska 1979), aff'd in part, 633 F.2d 799 (9th Cir. 1980).
101 See Ramstad v. Hodel, 756 F.2d 1379, 1383 (9th Cir. 1985); Wisenak, Inc. v.
Andrus, 471 F. Supp. 1004 (D. Alaska 1979); Appeal of Kodiak Island Setnetters, 85
Interior Dec. 200, 205 (June 12, 1978).
102 See Shepley v. Cowan, 91 U.S. 330, 338 (1876).
103 See Arnold v. Morton, 529 F.2d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 1976); Haley v. Seaton,
281 F.2d 620, 623-24 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
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criteria. 1°4 Applications are considered an "inchoate hope or
expectation," 105 which do not entitle the applicant to any legal
interest. °6 Applications fail to receive VER status because their
resolution is usually completely dependent upon an exercise of
executive discretion.10 7 Since an application is not a VER, land
may be withdrawn from the federal disposition scheme after the
application is filed, 08 and new conditions may be imposed on
the interest sought to be acquired by the applicant.' °9
2. Rights Arising Under State Law
A federal VER Law may include as VER certain interests in
land or resources created by state law. For example, under the
VER provisions of Section 522(e) of the Federal Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA)," 0 the Office
of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSMRE) at
one time decided to make VER determinations on Federal lands
by "using the VER definition contained in the appropriate state
. . . regulatory program.""' However legal problems may await
those that wish the state definition of VER to apply to questions
involving the existence of VER on federal lands within a state.
It is permissible for a federal statute such as SMCRA to
delegate to states the task of defining the VER phrase, if that
is the intention of the Congress." 2 But if a federal agency
implementing the federal statute authorizes the delegation, then
problems involving preemption may arise. A state VER defini-
tion may be far more restrictive than a federal definition, thereby
1o See Schraier v. Hickel, 419 F.2d 663, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
,05 See Rowe v. United States, 464 F. Supp. 1060, 1077 (D.Alaska 1979).
' See Miller v. Udall, 317 F.2d 573, 576 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
0o See Arnold v. Morton, 529 F.2d 1101, 1105-06 (9th Cir.1976).
'o' See McDonald v. Clark, 771 F.2d 460 (10th Cir. 1985); Aleknagik Natives Ltd.
v. Andrus, 648 F.2d 496, 502-03 (9th Cir. 1980); Richard S. Gregory, IBLA 86-80, 86
IBLA 256 (1987).
"o See Miller v. Udall, 317 F.2d 573 (D.C. Cir. 1963); American Nuclear Corp. v.
Andrus, 434 F. Supp. 1035, 1037 (D. Wyo. 1977); Glenn H. Johnson Western Coal Col,
IBLA 80-863, 71 IBLA 96 (1983).
"o 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e).
See 51 Fed. Reg. 41952, 41954-55 (Nov. 20, 1986).
12 See Northern Plains Resource Council v. OSMRE, 112 IBLA 266 (1990); Valley
Camp Coal Co. v. OSMRE, IBLA 84-632, 112 IBLA 19 (1989); The Stearns Co., IBLA
87-262, 110 IBLA 345 (1989); Blackmore Co., IBLA-260, 108 IBLA 1 (1989); In re
Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (Envt'l Inst.) 1083,
1090 (D.D.C. 1980); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 189, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 85 (1975).
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reducing dramatically the number of interests protected by the
statute's VER phrase." 3 If such use of the state definition is due
to federal agency delegation to states, reviewing courts will first
determine whether the agency was acting within the scope of its
congressionally delegated authority' 14 If the agency is not acting
ultra vires," 5 the general rule is that federal agency regulations
are presumed not to preempt state law "unless they declare their
intent to do so with some specificity." '"' 6 Federal deference to
state law is particularly appropriate where the subject involved
is one in which states have traditionally had primary authority."1
7
Even if the VER Law incorporates state VER definitions,
application of state law cannot work an unconstitutional, un-
compensated taking of private property rights."' Not even fed-
eral law can permit state law to violate the Fifth Amendment." ' 9
If federal law-makers are sensitive to legal problems associ-
ated with federalism and the Takings Clause, the federal VER
Law can recognize state-created property interests and grant
them protection as VER.' 20 VER Law may also protect more
inchoate acquisitions of property under state disposition
schemes.' 2' Even when federal law does not expressly preserve
state-created VER, courts may interpret the law to except from
its application previously established property interests arising
under state law. 2 2 Conversely, a state court might apply either
state2 1 or federal law' 24 to defeat a VER claim.
"I See Cogar v. Faerber, 371 S.E.2d 321, 324 (W. Va. 1988).
1" See City of New York v. FCC, 108 S. Ct. 1637, 1642 (1988).
"I See The Stearns Co., IBLA 87-262, 110 IBLA 345, 355 (1989) (Burski, Adm.
Judge concurring) (arguing that OSMRE exceeded its authority under SMCRA in dele-
gating VER definition responsibility to the states).
"1 Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co. 108 S. Ct. 1145, 1155 N.12 (1988), quoting
from California Coastal Com'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 583 (1987).
"I See Northwest Central Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Com'n, 109 S. Ct. 1262,
1276 (1989); Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 625 (1987).
"I See generally Willowbrook Mining Co. v. Com. Dept. of Envir.Res., 499 A.2d
2 (Pa. Cmwlth 1985).
"I See the Sunday Creek Coal Co. v. Hodel, Case No. C-2-88- 0416 (So. Dist., E.
Div. D.C. Ohio 1988).
' See subsection 17(b)(2) of ANCSA, 43 U.S. C. § 1616(b)(2), which protects
from ANCSA's provisions access to valid existing uses in place under state law. Alaska
Public Easement Defense Fund v. Andrus, 435 F. Supp. 664, 678 (D. Alaska 1977).
121 For example, ANCSA provides VER status to entrymen who have not yet
perfected their interests under state homesteading law. 43 U.S.C. § 1613(g); Appeal of
James E. Bedell, 86 Interior Dec. 60 (Jan. 31, 1979).
2 See City of Angoon v. Marsh, 749 F.2d 1413, 1416 (9th Cir.1984).
,2 See Thomas Stoelting, IBLA 81-627, 70 IBLA 231 (1983).
114 See Kile v. Belisle, 759 P.2d 1292, 1301 (Alaska 1988).
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When a VER Law protects "rights" under state law, the
nature, characteristics, and range of state-created property rights
should be determined solely by the states. 25 A state right pro-
tected as a VER under federal law is a property right to a
resource,1 26 a right to do something with the resource (e.g., use
or extract it),127 a right to do something with the resource in a
particular way (e.g., surface or underground extraction tech-
niques), 2 and a right to have the benefit of activities
29 or land'30
associated with the initial right.
But one should not assume that any of these state rights are
not VERs if actual on-the-ground operations have not com-
menced prior to the effective date of the VER Law. Because if
the law-maker had wanted to protect only existing operations,
the VER phrase would probably not have been used.'' Nor
should any of the above state rights be denied VER status for
lacking a state permit prior to the effective date of the VER
Law.3 2 This is because the presence or absence of permits does
not define the existence of a right; permits address only the
extent of regulation of the right.'
B. When Is a Right "Existing"?
It is not enough that an interest be a VER "right." That
interest must also "exist" prior to the effective date of the VER
123 See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
16 See Paug-Vik, Inc. v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 633 P.2d 1015, 1020 (Alaska
1981) (right to water under state law is a VER).
"' See Washington Water Power Co. v. FERC, 775 F.2d 305, 325 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(right to the use of water protected).
"I Whether a deed conveys the right to mine by a specific technique is strictly a
question of state law. See Commonwealth v. Fitzpatrick, 102 A.2d 893 (Pa. 1954); Miles
v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 63 A. 1032, 1033 (Pa. 1906).
I" See Alaska Public Easement Defense Fund v. Andrus, 435 F.Supp. 664, 668
(Alaska 1977) (right of access).
11 See Swoboda v. Pala Mining Co., 844 F.2d 654, 657-58 (9th Cir. 1988) (extra-
lateral rights).
"I' For example, FLPMA makes a distinction between its grandfather clause ex-
cepting "existing mining and grazing uses and mineral leasing," and "valid existing
rights." Compare 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c) with 43 U.S.C. § 1701 n. See also Sierra Club v.
Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1086-88 (10th Cir. 1988).
,12 See Valley Camp Coal Co. v. OSMRE, IBLA 84-632, 112 IBLA 19 (1989); Ruth
Z. Ainsley, IBLA 87-371, 88 IBLA 300 (1987) (denying a coal operator a VER under
SMCRA for failing to obtain necessary permits prior to SMCRA's effective date).
"I See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclam. Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 296 n.
37 (1981) (requiring permits to be issued as a precondition to VER status under SMCRA
"is not compelled by either the statutory language [of SMCRA] or its legislative his-
tory"); Skaw v. United States, 740 F.2d 932, 940 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (lack of a state permit
would not bar a miner's taking claim).
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Law to fall within VER protection. The issue of a right's pre-
VER Law existence turns on conditions occurring under Source
Law, as well as events and laws that may affect the right after
adoption of the VER Law.
A right may exist pre-VER Law if the right-holder has sat-
isfied all the preconditions necessary under Source Law, and if
the Source Law permits rights to arise without an intervening
discretionary act. For example, a mining claimant who has made
a discovery and properly located a claim has a VER under the
1872 Mining Law (Source Law), 3 4 and the Secretary of Interior
need not validate it by an exercise of discretion.'35 However, the
right does not exist pre-VER Law if (1) all the necessary pre-
conditions to acquisition of the right under Source Law have
not been satisfied, 3 6 (2) other laws in place pre-VER prevent a
VER right from arising under Source Law, 13 7 or (3) the right
sought is not considered a VER right.13
A right may also exist pre-VER Law as a result of executive
discretion. Although the executive may not be required to ap-
prove an application, 3 9 if an application is approved through an
exercise of discretion, the applicant has a VER.'1° Prior to the
exercise of executive discretion, when the right does not yet
exist, either Congress or the Executive can change retroactively
the rules for acquiring the right. This retroactive change may
extinguish the ability of the applicant to obtain the right, 14 1 or
See Oregon Portland Cement Co., 88 Interior Dec. 760, 771 (Aug. 25, 1981).
The self-executing nature of an unpatented mining claims under the 1872 Mining
Law is described in Wilbur v. U.S. ex rel. Krushnic, 280 U.S. 306, 316-17 (1930).
,36 To establish a VER, mining claimants on land withdrawn from mineral entry
must prove that a discovery has been made as of the date of withdrawal. See Cameron
v. United States, 252 U.S. 450, 456 (1920); Pruess v. Udall, 286 F. Supp. 138, 140-41
(D. Ore. 1968); Snyder v. Udall, 267 F. Supp. 110 (D. Colo. 1967).
117 See Ramona Field, 110 IBLA 367 (1989) (applicant has no valid right to an
allotment for land where the occupancy begins after the land has been withdrawn).
316 James W. Taylor & Assoc., IBLA 83-480, 76 IBLA 103 (1983) (requests to
participate in coal expiration licenses not VER under ANCSA).
39 Compare Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 4 (1965) (if federal leasing statute leaves
Secretary of Interior discretion to refuse to issue any lease at all, the Secretary is under
no statutory obligation to issue a lease), with NRDC v. Berklund, 609 F.2d 553 (D.C.
Cir. 1979) (Secretary does not have discretion to reject applications if applicant has met
Source Law test for lease issuance).
See, e.g., Hinton v. Udall, 364 F.2d 676, 678 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (VER in grazing
permit); Nelbro Packing Co., 88 Interior Dec. 352, 358 (Mar. 9, 1981) (VER in right-
of-way).
"4 Applications for noncompetitive oil and gas leases under the 1920 Mineral
Leasing Act were found to be extinguished by the operation of subsequent law in
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impose unanticipated conditions on the right once it is ac-
quired. 142 In the latter case, the right exists pre-VER Law, but
is burdened post-VER Law by conditions imposed by the Source
Law.
A VER's continued post-VER Law existence may be affected
by the operation of the VER Law itself. For example, for a
mining claimant to perfect as a VER an unpatented mining
location prior to withdrawal of an area for wilderness purposes,
the claimant must prove the discovery of a "valuable mineral
deposit."' 43 One of the elements of discovery is evidence of a
"present and continuing demand" for the minerals. 14 When
there has been a withdrawal, the claimant must show that the
demand for the mineral existed at the time of the withdrawal,
as well as at the time the discovery is being contested. 4 Diffi-
culties may occur if buyers were willing to purchase the minerals
discovered pre-withdrawal, but not post-withdrawal (because of
marketplace reluctance to purchase the products of a wilderness
mine).' 46 If the mining claimant's "discovery" consists of a
deposit of a mineral for which there is a limited market, the
wilderness claimant may find, post-withdrawal, that there has
been no discovery because there are no buyers willing to buy the
"tainted" product of a mine in a sensitive area. If there is no
valid discovery, there is no VER in the claim. The ironic con-
sequence is that, despite the protective VER phrase, operation
of the VER Law (the wilderness withdrawal recognizing VER)
has nullified the VER.
Laws other than the VER Law can affect the continued
existence of the VER after adoption of the VER Law. The
federal law-maker may impose a condition subsequent on the
VER, such as the recordation requirements of the Federal Land
McDonald v. Clark, 771 F.2d 460 (10th Cir. 1985); Justheim Petroleum Co. v. Dep't
of Interior, 769 F.2d 668 (10th Cir. 1985). Application for a stockraising homestead was
found to be extinguished by operation of subsequent law in George J. Propp, 56 Interior
Dec. 347 (July 22, 1938).
,41 See Hannifin v. Morton, 444 F.2d 200 (10th Cir. 1971); Portland General Elec.
Co. v. Federal Power Comm., 328 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1964).
.43 30 U.S. C. § 22.
- United States v. Rouse, 56 IBLA 36 (1981).
' See United States v. Duval, 53 IBLA 341 (1981).
116 See United States v. Marion, 37 IBLA 68, 77-78 (1978) (a prospective buyer
cancelled a contract because the buyer did not wish to be involved in the adverse
publicity attendant to the exploitation of wilderness mining claims).
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Policy and Management Act, 47 or the Mining in the Parks Act.148
Although a VER Law protects VERs, failure to comply with the
subsequent requirements of these laws will extinguish the VER.1
49
Similarly, if a VER Law withdraws land from mining, an
"amended" location will, under the 1872 Mining Law, relate
back to a VER established under Source Law; a post-VER Law
"relocation," however, will not relate back and the relocation
will not qualify as a VER. 150
Conversely, some VER Laws permit the creation of VERs
after the effective date of the VER Law. For example, SMCRA's
VER language 5' has been interpreted by the Secretary of Interior
to permit "continually created valid existing rights."'15 2 Such
rights would attach if, after enactment of SMCRA, a coal mining
operation properly initiated on a particular parcel of land were
later designated as unsuitable for mining pursuant to SMCRA.
This mine would be a VER which could continue to operate in
the unsuitable area. In National Wildlife Federation v. Hodel,'53
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
sustained the notion of a continually-created VER as "a reason-
able interpretation of [SMCRA]."1
5 4
C. When Is an Existing Right "Valid"?
For an interest in land or resources to be a VER it must be
"valid." An interest must be valid (1) under Source Law and
applicable pre-VER conditions, (2) under the VER Law if this
law spells out how the validity of an interest is to be deter-
mined,'55 and (3) under post-VER Law subsequent conditions. 5 6
W 43 U.S.C. § 1744.
148 16 U.S.C. § 1907.
',9 See United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985); Nequoia Ass'n, Inc.v. Dept. of
Interior of U.S., 626 F. Supp. 827 (D. Utah 1985).
See Rick and Linda Anderson, IBLA 83-538, 76 IBLA 212 (1983); Grace P.
Crocker, IBLA 82-578, 73 IBLA 78 (1983); R. Gail Tibbetts, 43 IBLA 210, 86 I.D. 538
(1979).
30 U.S.C. § 1272(e).
52 "Where an area comes under the protection of Section 522(e) of the Act [30
U.S.C. § 1272(e)] after August 3, 1977, valid existing rights shall be found if-(l) on
the date the protection comes into existence, a validly authorized coal mining operation
exists on that area ...." 47 Fed. Reg. 25281 (1982); 30 C.F.R. § 761.5(d).
839 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
Id. at 748-751.
' See Northern Alaska Environmental Center v. Lujan, 872 F.2d 901, 904 (9th
Cir. 1989) (ANILCA does not prescribe to the Interior Secretary the factors to be
considered in exercising his discretion in determining the validity of a mining claim).
'5 See text accompanying notes 147-150, supra.
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If the interest is invalid, the VER Law is not "subject to" it.' 57
Prior to the adoption of the VER Law, an interest may be
deemed invalid if it arose on land previously reserved'58 or with-
drawn.'5 9 It may also be invalid if operation of a pre-VER Law
is fatal to the claim.160 An interest is more likely to be invalid
for failure to comply with the original requirements of the
Source Law. '
6'
IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF VER STATUS
If an interest is a "right" which is also "valid" and "exist-
ing" pre-VER Law, then that interest is a VER as used in the
VER Law. VER status means only that the interest is a VER; it
does not signify what consequences follow from this status. A
separate determination is needed regarding the extent to which,
or whether, the VER is immunized from operation and appli-
cation of the VER Law. 162
To ascertain what the law-maker intended by inclusion of
the VER phrase, one should turn to the language of the phrase
itself. 63 A VER Law is usually made "subject to" VERs. Use
of the exact words "subject to" is critical to an understanding
" Tetlin Native Corp. v. State, 759 P.2d 528, 534 (Alaska 1988); Charles Edward-
sen, IBLA 83-376, 77 IBLA 228 (1983).
"I See Wisenak, Inc. v. Andrus, 471 F. Supp. 1004, 1008-09 (D.Alaska 1979).
,,9 See Ramona Field, 110 IBLA 367 (1989); C.J. Belding, 87 IBLA 722, 109 IBLA
198 (1989).
,, See Washington Water Power Co. v. FERC, 775 F.2d 305, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
361 See American Indians Residing on Maricopa-Ak Chen v. U.S., 667 F.2d 980,998
(Ct. Cl. 1981) (no VER because of failure to comply with the filing requirements of the
1875 Right- of-Way Act); West Coast Exploration Co. v. McKay, 213 F.2d 582, 607
(D.C. Cir. 1954) (no VER when entryman did not comply with all requirements necessary
for acquisition of a possessory interest).
VER mining claims are most commonly invalidated for failure to comply with the
requirements of the 1872 Mining Law. Claims have been deemed invalid for failure to
(1) follow location procedures (see Thomas Stoelting, IBLA 81- 627, 70 IBLA 231
(1983); John Loskot, IBLA 81-1020, 71 IBLA 165 (1983); Thomas Johnson, IBLA 82-
1166, 77 IBLA 20 (1983)), (2) perform assessment work (see Kile v. Belisle, 759 P.2d
1292, 1301 (Alaska 1988); Steven R. Headig, IBLA 88-114, 110 IBLA 245 (1989)), or
(3) make discovery of a valuable mineral deposit (see Doyon, Ltd., IBLA 82-1120, 75
IBLA 65 (1983); Toffenetti, Valid Mining Rights and Wilderness Areas, 20 Land and
Water L. Rev. 31, 36-7, 48-57, 60 (1985)).
161 See Note, Regulation and Land Withdrawals: Defining "Valid Existing Rights,"
3 J. MIN. L. & POL'Y, 517, 542-43 (1988); Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305, 334-
35 (D.C. Cal. 1985).
,63 See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp. 442 U.S. 330, 337 (1979); Buettner v. Kavilco,
Inc. 860 F.2d 341, 343 (9th Cir. 1988).
JOURNAL OF MINERAL LAW & POLICY
of the law-makers's intent. Federal law-makers can make the
VER Law "subject to" VERs, 64 or, alternatively, make the VER
Law apply to areas "not now covered by" VERs, 165 or "except
under and in accordance with the terms of" VERs. 66 The law-
maker can be more direct, and state simply that VERs "shall
not be affected by" the VER Law.1
67
Regardless of which words are used, acknowledgement of
VERs means that the law-maker intends to make some kind of
exception for them. The nature of this exception will depend
upon whether the VER phrase employs the words "subject to,"
or some other language. Language differences in the VER phrase
are not "mere technical variations in word usage which are of
no substantive importance." 68 Different word choices are "made
for a purpose . . . and intended [to] have different meaning."' 169
If the phrase contains the more commonly used "subject to"
language, then one can presume that the law-maker intended
certain positive and negative consequences for the holder of the
VER.
A. Positive Consequences for the VER Holder
A VER Law that is "subject to" interests deemed VER
means that VERs are (1) a species of property right, 170 which (2)
are in some way protected from the VER Law.'17 As "property,"
VERs can be freely conveyed or transferred, 7 2 but cannot be
"taken" without compensation. 73 While the VER Law may have
I' See Meridian Land and Mineral Co. v. Hodel, 843 F.2d 340, 341 (9th Cir.
1988).
16 See Arnold v. Morton, 529 F.2d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 1976).
66 Northwest Paper Co. v. FPC, 344 F.2d 47, 49-50 (8th Cir.1965).
167 Baltese v. Apache County, 630 P.2d 1027, 1028 (Ariz. 1981).
61 See Arnold v. Morton, supra note 165 at 1104.
6 Navajo Indian Reservation, 30 L.D. 515, 518-19 (1901).
110 See Forbes v. Gracey, 94 U.S. 762, 767 (1876); Barkeley and Albert, supra note
6 at 9-6.
"7 See Tetlin Native Corp. v. State, 759 P.2d 528, 533 (Alaska 1988) (where patent
is subject to VER, patentee takes subject to those rights until they are adjudicated
invalid); see generally Solicitor's Opinion No. M-36910 (Supp.), 86 I.D. 909 (1981).
"2 See Aleknagik Natives, Ltd. v. United States, 635 F. Supp.1477, 1492 (D. Alaska
1985), aff'd 806 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1986); H.R. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 189
(1977).
" See National Wildlife Federation v. Hodel, 839 F.2d 694, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1988);
Skaw v. United States, 740 F.2d 932 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Utah v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp.
995, 1010-11 (D. Utah 1979). See also H.R. 2: The Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Energy and Environ-
ment of the Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 95th Cong. 1st Sess., at 42 (1977)
(testimony of Mr. Eckhardt, "[Tihis act protects valid existing rights. Now, I assume
that means constitutional rights.").
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some effect on the VER, 74 a VER is usually exempt from the
law's most onerous restrictions.1 75 In any event, the VER Law
cannot apply to the VER so as to unreasonably interfere with
the enjoyment of the right permitted under either the Source
Law, 7 6 or the VER Law.
177
The benefits of VER status also vary according to the pur-
pose of the VER Law. If the VER Law intends to prevent
private party acquisition of certain property rights from the
United States, the holder of a VER may be entitled to receive
those rights if Source Law requirements for such rights have
been met. 7 1 If the VER Law withdraws public land or resources
from private acquisition, a VER is exempt from the with-
drawal.179 If the VER Law imposes a strict regulatory require-
ment, the VER need not comply with the requirement.8 0
B. Negative Consequences for the VER Holder
A VER Law that is "subject to" VERs will nonetheless
burden VERs in several ways. First, if the VER Law withdraws
land, the "subject to" language indicates that all of the land
"I, See Solicitor's Opinion M-36910 (Supp.), 88 I.D. 909, 914 (Oct. 5, 1981) (VER
status under FLPMA does not prevent the Interior Secretary from imposing on it
"reasonable mitigating measures to protect environmental values.").
"I See Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1086-88 (10th Cir.1988) (VERs under
FLPMA exempt from the nonimpairment standard).
'7 See Utah v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 995, 1010 (D. Utah 1979); (VER Law cannot
be "so prohibitively restrictive as to render the [VER] incapable of full economic
development"); Swoboda v. Pala Mining Co., 844 F.2d 654, 658 (9th Cir. 1988) (VER
Law cannot preclude VER holder of extralateral rights); Utah Wilderness Ass'n, IBLA
84-863, 81 IBLA 124 (1986) (oil and gas lease VERs under FLPMA entitled to issuance
of permits to drill).
"I See Buettner v. Kavilco, Inc., 860 F.2d 341, 343 (9th Cir.1988) (VER status
should not prevent VER holder from obtaining title to land under the VER Law,
ANCSA).
"I' See NRDC v. Berklund, 609 F.2d 553, 558 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (applicants for
preference right coal leases who have fulfilled the statutory requirements of the 1920
Mineral Leasing Act prior to the passage of the FCLAA have a valid existing right to
such leases, otherwise prevented by the FCLAA); Utah Int'l v. Andrus, 488 F. Supp.
976, 986 (D. Colo. 1980); Kin-Ark Corp., 45 IBLA 159, 87 Interior Dec. 14 (Jan. 23,
1980).
179 See Aleknagik Natives Ltd. v. United States, 806 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1986)
(townsites protected); State of Alaska, Dep't of Transportation v. First Nat'l Bank of
Anchorage, 689 P.2d 483 (Alaska 1984) (homestead entry protected); Skaw v. United
States, 740 F.2d 932 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (unpatented mining claim protected).
1w See National Wildlife Federation v. Hodel, 839 F.2d 694, 749-50 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (VERs not subject to SMCRA's unsuitability provisions); Sierra Club v. Hodel,
848 F.2d 1068, 1086-88 (10th Cir. 1988) (VERs not subject to FLPMA's nonimpairment
standard).
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within the exterior boundary of the designated area is meant to
be included in the withdrawal. While VERs within the withdrawn
land are excepted from the withdrawal, the "subject to" wording
means that the VER land has ceased to be part of the public
domain post-withdrawal. As a result, if the VERs are later found
to be invalid, or if by their own terms subsequently expire, the
VER land automatically becomes part of the withdrawal. Con-
versely, if the VER phrase is qualified by language other than
"subject to," such as "not now covered by," then the intent of
the law-maker is to leave islands of public land within the
withdrawal area, that are not withdrawn if the VERs are later
extinguished.'8 '
Second, VERs remain limited by obligations that arise under
Source Law. VER status does not add to the nature of the
existing property interest;' 82 nor does VER status exempt VER
from the operation or requirements of laws in effect pre-VER
Law. 183
Third, VERs are not entirely immune from application of
the VER Law. Consistent with constitutional safeguards, VER
may be regulated under the VER Law, even to the extent of
diminishing their value.'8 4 However, VER Law regulation cannot
unduly "impinge upon" or "make . . .unprofitable" the exer-
cise of VER rights.'85 VER status also does not prevent the VER
Law from extinguishing the opportunity for the VER-holder to
" See Arnold v. Morton, 529 F.2d 1101, 1103-05 (9th Cir.1976).
, See Bowman v. Udall, 243 F. Supp. 672, 677-78 (D.D.C. 1965) (while grazing
leases are VERs, VER status does not vest in the holder any right to mine minerals
underlying lands covered by the leases).
"' See Shultz v. Dep't of Army, 886 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir.1989)(VERs subject to
federal statute of limitations); Ramex Mining Corp. v. Watt, 753 F.2d 521, 524 (6th
Cir. 1985) (VERs subject to the ripeness doctrine).
'" See BAYNARD, PUBLIC LAND LAW AND PROCEDURE, § 2.23 (1986); Solicitor's
Opinion, M-36910 (Supp.) 88 I.D. 909, 914 (Oct. 5, 1981); Sierra Club v. Hodel, 675
F. Supp. 594, 609 (D. Utah 1987), aff'd 848 F.2d 1068 (10th Cir. 1988) (a VER under
FLPMA may "impair" its suitability for wilderness classification, but may not be
permitted to "unduly degrade" a wilderness study area); Note, Regulation and Land
Withdrawals: Defining "Valid Existing Rights," 3 J. OF MIN. L. & POL'Y 517, 525
(1988) (VERs may be regulated under SMCRA); Fish, Preservation and Strategic Mineral
Development in Alaska: Congress Writes a New Equation, 12 ENVT'L LAW 137, 160-
172 (1981) (VERs may be regulated in national parks and national wildlife refuges);
Toffenetti, Valid Mining Rights and Wilderness Areas, 20 LAND & WATER L. REV. 31,
61-2 (1985) (VERs may be regulated in wilderness areas).
"I See Hinton v. Udall, 364 F.2d 676, 678 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Utah v. Andrus, 486
F. Supp. 995, 1011 (D. Utah 1979).
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obtain a fee interest from the United States.1 6 The rationale for
this result is that the "subject to" language only forbids the
VER Law from divesting the VER-holder of a property interest;




Retroactive law-making often imposes new and unforeseen
burdens on those holding existing property interests. While in-
clusion of a VER phrase tends to mitigate some of the burdens,
the usual lack of definition of the VER phrase creates additional
problems of interpretation. The VER phrase itself does not tell
interested parties (1) who is to decide its meaning, (2) what it
means, or (3) what results should occur from its application.
While agencies and courts have struggled to address these ques-
tions by fashioning a kind of VER jurisprudence, there remains
a far better solution. Rather than rely on the customary, unclear
VER phrase, federal law-makers should express their intention
about existing interests in more explicit language. Use of grand-
father or savings clauses that spell out the law-maker's wishes
would provide all affected parties the kind of needed guidance
that is so missing in the words-'"subject to valid existing rights."
I" Alaska Miners v. Andrus, 662 F.2d 577, 579-80 (9th Cir. 1981) (upholding
ANCSA's five-year limitation period on the opportunity of mining claimants holding
VERs to patent on native corporation lands).
"I See Freese v. United States, 639 F.2d 754, 758 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
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